

ROOSEVELT SHAPED 2 YALTA SOLUTIONS

Byrnes, Home, Says President Initiated Plan for Poland, Security Vote Formula

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WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 — The solution of the Polish question and the formula on voting procedure in the council of the projected world organization for security and peace—two of the thorniest problems resolved by the Crimea Conference—were proposed by President Roosevelt, James F. Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, disclosed today on his return from the meeting.

He returned with Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. They were the first to get back in the capital from the historic meeting.

At an hour's news conference in the White House Mr. Byrnes stressed the importance of the decisions reached. He warned that the war in Europe was far from over.

While he did not reveal the voting formula, pending its present consideration by the three powers with France and China, he disclosed that through no formal vote, but by the ready consent of Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, President Roosevelt presided at the meetings.

President Roosevelt brought the proposal concerning liberated areas to the conference, Mr. Byrnes said, because of a feeling in this country that recent unilateral actions were leading to spheres of influence. Now, under the declaration, the United States assumes a share of the responsibility for conditions in such countries as Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania and Bulgaria. The status of the Baltic

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States, as far as he knew, was not discussed.

Before Mr. Byrnes received the correspondents, Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, issued statements praising the results of the Big Three meeting and the decision to hold meetings of Foreign Ministers of the three great powers at intervals of three months or more.

Mr. Grew further indicated that Polish difficulties were yielding to treatment, announcing that relief cargoes would now be carried in ships, not only for Czechoslovakia and Italy but also for Poland, to be used by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in its activities. Heretofore the Soviet Government has refused to permit UNRRA to operate in Poland.

Opinion in Congress was predominantly one of support for the results achieved in the Crimea, although some divergencies appeared over details, particularly with respect to the Polish problem.

In the course of his discussion, Mr. Byrnes defended the Polish settlement vigorously. He stressed the decisions reached on liberated areas with the aim of maintaining order and encouraging a return to stable conditions.

Implies Dates Are Coincidence

He rejected suggestions that April 25 had been selected as the date of the United Nations' conference, to draft in final form the charter for the world security organization, with the idea that by that time Russia would be taking steps to declare war on Japan. The Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact expires the day before.

The date was set by the three Foreign Ministers in consultation, he said, because it was found to be the earliest day on which it would be feasible for the conference to assemble, all factors considered.

Mr. Byrnes indicated that President Roosevelt's role as presiding officer at the conference was chiefly in connection with political and economic questions, as military questions were entrusted primarily to the chiefs of staffs of the powers.

"Every American," he said, "should be proud of the role played by the President, especially in the discussion of economic and political problems. He showed great skill, tact, patience and good humor, and more than once by those traits brought about decisions."

Mr. Byrnes expressed the hope that on his return Mr. Roosevelt would make a report on the conference to the Congress or directly to the people by radio.

In warning against expectation of an early military victory in Europe, Mr. Byrnes said that the military leaders at the conference planned for warfare "involving more men than ever before in this bloody conflict." They were not counting on an early internal collapse in Germany, though not ignoring that possibility, he added.

"If Hitler had relied for success on a division among the powers represented at the conference," he said, "he is doomed as never before, because I was tremendously impressed by the comradeship and genuine affection shown by the three leaders."

In general, he remarked, the im-

portant thing to him was that decisions were reached. Many of them, he said, have not been published and will become known only as events unfold. He considered the declaration concerning liberated areas and the formula adopted on voting in the Security Council among the most important specific results of the conference.

Mr. Byrnes explained that, now that the three powers had adopted a policy of acting in concert in liberated areas, it was hoped that political factions that might resort to violence or appeal to some great outside power for support would be deterred.

The aim, he said, was to cooperate in support of a provisional government, with free and fair elections eventually held to bring into power governments truly representative of the people. If ambassadors of the Big Three in a country report that dangerous conditions are developing, their Governments can consider the problem and send a commission to investigate and so encourage the maintenance of law and order.

The reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter will give hope to small nations and so contribute to the adoption of the projected United Nations security organization, Mr. Byrnes stressed.

In discussing the Polish situation he referred to the solution adopted at the conference as a "compromise." Nevertheless, he considered that the language used in the statement should be encouraging to those supporting the Government in Exile, for instead of recognizing the Warsaw or Lublin Government, he argued, a new government is to be formed, based on both groups, as well as other Polish elements. Eventually elections of a permanent government are contemplated.

"It must be remembered," Mr. Byrnes said, "that the Russian Army has liberated Poland. The Soviet position is that Russia does not want behind its armies any government which they cannot trust. The Russians cannot be looking back while going forward to Berlin."

He explained that the facts would now be sought by the three-power commission the major powers decided to send to Warsaw to survey the situation.

He was inclined, however, to the view that Russia could make a case for the Curzon Line as the boundary of Poland in view of the Allies' record in favor of it at the end of the last war. Furthermore, he said, Russia wants a strong

Poland as a guard against "the German menace."

Mr. Byrnes took note of criticisms that the Crimean declaration said nothing about freedom of religion. His answer was that it reaffirmed the declaration of the United Nations, which specifically guarantees that freedom.

Asked whether Italy was considered to be a liberated area, he replied that he did not hear Italy discussed at Yalta.

Mr. Byrnes said that he was not in a position to discuss the supreme commanders for the central control commission that will rule a de-

feated Germany, explaining that no names had yet been decided.

Lwow Believed Going to Russia

LONDON, Feb. 13 (U.P.)—Informed diplomatic quarters said today it was understood that Lwow, about forty-five miles on the Russian side of the Curzon Line, had been given to Russia at Yalta.

It was generally understood that the Big Three had decided on Curzon Line A, an extension of the line fixed at the end of World War I. The extension cuts Lwow from Poland.